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Activist’s conviction for hooliganism over “obscene” protest violated Article 10 ECHR 
 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh and Dirk Voorhoof 
 
On 15 January 2019, the European Court’s Second Section unanimously found that an anti-
corruption activist’s conviction for staging an “obscene” demonstration outside a prosecutor’s 
office, targeting a number of public officials, violated the activist’s freedom of expression. 
The Court in Mătăsaru v. the Republic of Moldova took the Moldovan courts to task for 
holding that Article 10 of the European Convention was not applicable to the activist’s 
protest, with the European Court reiterating that “expressive conduct” which shocks, offends 
or disturbs is fully protected under Article 10’s guarantee of freedom of expression. 
 
Facts 
 
The applicant in the case was Anatol Mătăsaru, a 49-year-old resident of the Moldovan 
capital Chișinău. The case began in late January 2013, when Mătăsaru demonstrated outside 
the Prosecutor General’s Office in Chișinău to protest against the ‘corruption and the control 
exercised by politicians over the Prosecutor General’s Office’. The protest involved erecting 
two large wooden sculptures on the stairs of the Prosecutor General’s Office, the first being a 
large penis with a picture of a public official attached to its head; while the second was a 
large vulva with pictures of several officials from the prosecutor’s office in the middle (see 
here and here). The protest lasted an hour before police officers intervened, arresting 
Mătăsaru and seizing the sculptures. 
 
Mătăsaru was charged with hooliganism under Article 287 of the Moldovan Criminal Code, 
defined as ‘deliberate actions grossly violating public order, involving violence or threats of 
violence or resistance to authorities’ representatives or to other persons who suppress such 
actions as well as actions that by their content are distinguished by an excessive cynicism or 
impudence’. Two years later, Mătăsaru was convicted of hooliganism by the Râșcani District 
Court, and received a two-year prison sentence, suspended for three years. The District Court 
held that Mătăsaru’s actions had been “immoral” and exposed “obscene” sculptures in a 
public place where ‘they could be seen by anyone, including by children’. The District Court 
also held ‘assimilating public officials with genitals went beyond the acceptable limits of 
criticism’, and was ‘not an act protected under Article 10 [of the ECHR]’. Mătăsaru’s 
conviction and sentence were upheld by both the Chișinău Court of Appeal and Moldova’s 
Supreme Court of Justice. 
 
Judgment 
 
Mătăsaru made an application to the European Court, claiming his conviction was a violation 
of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10. Mătăsaru submitted that his conviction 
was not ‘prescribed by law’, arguing the Criminal Code’s Article 287 on the offence of 
hooliganism was ‘not applicable to the particular circumstances of his case’. However, the 
Court, while noting the Moldovan courts had ‘failed to explain in a satisfactory manner why 
they opted for the criminal sanction provided for by Article 287’, held it was ‘unnecessary’ to 
decide the issue given the Court’s later findings. Thus, the main question for the European 
Court was whether the conviction had been ‘necessary in a democratic society’.  
 
The Court first reiterated that Article 10 protects ‘expressive conduct’, including expressive 
conduct which offends, shocks or disturbs the State or ‘any section of the population’. The 
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Court referred to its previous case law on expressive conduct where it had found the 
following: displaying dirty laundry near the Hungarian parliament was a form of ‘political 
expression’ (Tatár and Fáber v. Hungary); pouring paint on statues of Atatürk was an 
‘expressive act’ performed as a protest against the political regime (Murat Vural v. Turkey); 
detaching a ribbon from a wreath laid by the Ukrainian President at a monument was a form 
of ‘political expression’ (Shvydka v. Ukraine); and the Pussy Riot punk band attempting to 
perform from the altar of a Moscow cathedral was a form of ‘artistic and political expression’ 
(Maria Alekhina and Others v. Russia) (see our post).   
 
The Court then examined Mătăsaru’s protest, and noted that he had been found guilty of 
hooliganism because during his protest he had exposed public sculptures of an obscene nature 
and because he had attached to them pictures of a politician and several senior prosecutors, 
thus ‘offending [the politician and senior prosecutors] and infringing their right to dignity’. 
Applying its Article 10 principles, the Court held that it ‘cannot agree’ with the Moldovan 
courts’ ruling that Article 10 of the Convention was ‘inapplicable to the applicant’s conduct’. 
The Court noted that the Moldovan courts did not conduct a ‘proper balancing exercise’ 
under Article 10 of the different interests involved, and imposed a ‘very heavy sanction’ on 
the applicant in the form of a suspended prison sentence. The Court then applied its 
unanimous Grand Chamber judgment in Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania, holding that the 
circumstances of Mătăsaru’s protest ‘present no justification whatsoever for the imposition of 
a prison sentence’. This was because a prison sentence, even if suspended, by its very nature, 
not only has negative repercussions on the applicant, but may also have a ‘serious chilling 
effect’ on other persons and discourage them from exercising their freedom of expression.  
 
The Court concluded that although the interference with freedom of expression ‘may have 
been justified by the concern to restore the balance between the various competing interests at 
stake’, the criminal sanction imposed was ‘manifestly disproportionate in its nature and 
severity to the legitimate aim pursued by the domestic authorities’. Thus, the Court 
unanimously held that the Moldovan courts went beyond what would have amounted to a 
‘necessary’ restriction on the applicant’s freedom of expression, therefore in violation of 
Article 10.  
 
Comment 
 
The unanimous judgment in Mătăsaru is a strong reaffirmation that domestic courts may not 
impose prison sentences, even if suspended, on peaceful protestors engaging in expressive 
conduct (including artistic and satirical expression) on matters of public interest. The Court 
was categorical on this point, holding that there was no justification whatsoever for a 
suspended prison sentence. This amplifies the Court’s case law that a peaceful demonstration 
should not, ‘in principle’, be made subject to the ‘threat of a penal sanction’ (see, e.g., 
Pekaslan and Others v. Turkey, Taranenko v. Russia, Primov v. Russia, Nemtsov v. Russia, 
Frumkin v. Russia, and Yılmaz Yıldız and Others v. Turkey) (and our post on Novikova v. 
Russia).  
 
Mătăsaru is particularly important and timely, given the controversial Sinkova v. Ukraine 
judgment last year from the Court’s Fourth Section (see our post). By a 4-3 vote, the Sinkova 
majority held that a protestor’s arrest, three-month pre-trial detention, conviction and 
suspended two-year prison sentence, for staging a performance-art protest at a war memorial 
did not violate Article 10. The judgment prompted a rigorous dissent, which highlighted 
‘inconsistency’ with the Court’s prior case law on the imposition of suspended prison 
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sentences, and issued a stark warning of a ‘real risk of eroding the right of individuals to 
voice their opinions and protest through peaceful, albeit controversial, means’.  
 
This warning prompted over 22 international and national organisations involved in freedom 
of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly to support a request for a referral of Sinkova 
to the 17-judge Grand Chamber of the Court (see here). A five-judge Panel of the Grand 
Chamber however rejected the request for a referral. Of note, the Court in Mătăsaru nowhere 
mentioned, nor even cited, the Sinkova judgment. Indeed, Sinkova has not been applied in a 
Court judgment to date, and the Mătăsaru judgment leads to Sinkova becoming a disapproved 
and lone aberration in the case law on the imposition of suspended prison sentences for 
peaceful protest and participation in matters of public debate. 
 
While Mătăsaru is a welcome judgment, one point needs to be teased out relating to the 
Court’s statement in the second-last paragraph: that the interference with freedom of 
expression ‘may have been justified by the concern to restore the balance between the various 
competing interests at stake’. The Court seemed to be leaving open the suggestion that there 
existed certain interests which outweighed the applicant’s freedom of expression. But while 
the Court did not explore the point fully, a brief mention of the relevant case law would have 
been relevant and informative. 
 
The Court has already dealt with the distinct issue of public officials seeking to prohibit their 
depiction in an ‘obscene’ manner. The leading judgment is Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. 
Austria, concerning an injunction preventing further depiction of a politician where a photo 
of his face was placed on a painted naked body, ‘gripping the ejaculating penis’ of another 
public official, while ‘being touched by two other’ public officials and ‘ejaculating on Mother 
Teresa’. The Court found a violation of Article 10, as the politician’s ‘personal interests’ did 
not outweigh the right to engage in satirical expression on a matter of public interest, and 
targeting a public official.  The Court applied the principle that satire is a form of ‘artistic 
expression and social commentary’, and by its ‘inherent features of exaggeration and 
distortion of reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate’. Further, the expression at issue 
could not be ‘understood to address details’ of the politician’s private life, but rather his 
‘public standing as a politician’, and public officials must ‘display a wider tolerance in 
respect of criticism’. Of course, it must be recognised that the Court takes a different 
approach to ‘obscene’ expression relating to non-public officials (Palomo Sánchez and 
Others v. Spain) and religion (see, e.g., Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, Wingrove v. the 
United Kingdom, İ.A. v. Turkey, and E.S. v. Austria; to some extent, contra in Aydın Tatlav v. 
Turkey, and see also Akdaş v. Turkey). 
 
But the expressive conduct in Mătăsaru was political expression targeting an elected official, 
and a number of public officials, in their official capacity, and on a matter of public interest. 
Indeed, on the public interest element, the Court has confirmed in other judgments 
concerning Moldova and anti-corruption policy (Guja v. Moldova, and Guja v. Moldova (No. 
2)), the ‘strong public interest’ on the issue of  ‘separation of powers’ and ‘improper conduct’ 
by high-ranking politicians and involving the Prosecutor General’s Office. In this regard, the 
Court has long held that there is ‘little scope’ for restrictions on expression on matters of 
public interest, and domestic authorities have a ‘particularly narrow’ margin of appreciation 
(Morice v. France).  It must be remembered that Mătăsaru involved criminal proceedings for 
hooliganism, and not administrative proceedings, nor civil proceedings by the public officials 
targeted. This would be difficult to square with the Court’s principle that the ‘dominant 
position which those in power occupy’ makes it ‘necessary for them to display restraint in 
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resorting to criminal proceedings’, and only in ‘certain grave cases - for instance in the case 
of speech inciting to violence’. There was no suggestion that the expressive conduct in 
Mătăsaru was anything other than entirely peaceful.  
 
